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Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure
Passivity in Tender Offer Defense
Ronald J. Gilson*
Responding to my comments in the Stanford Law Review, 1 and to
those of Lucian Bebchuk in the Harvard.Law Review, 2 Professors Easterbrook and Fischel have reiterated their preference for a rule of
pure passivity by target management in response to a tender offer.
Unlike my more limited rule barring defensive tactics designed to
prevent the offer but not barring the facilitation of competitive bids,
Easterbrook and Fischel would prohibit both.' Because their response to the points that Bebchuk and I raised goes beyond their
initial treatment of the subject, it is appropriate that I respond here
by extending the arguments I originally presented.
As originally put, Easterbrook and Fischel argued that auctioneering was undesirable because of the sunk costs in information incurred by the original bidder. If a competitive bid was successful, the
unsuccessful first bidder would be unable to recover these costs; the
risk of this occurrence would reduce the incentive to invest in information in the first place. Therefore, monitoring would decrease and
*

Associate Professor of Law, Stanford University. I am grateful to Professors Frank H.

Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel for the dialogue reflected in this exchange. I look forward
to the opportunity to disagree with each of them on small parts of major positions in the
future. I am also grateful to Lucian Bebchuk, Bernard Black, Henry Hansmann, Thomas
Jackson, Roberta Romano, and participants in the University of Pennsylvania Transaction
Costs Economics Workshop for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1. Gilson, A StructuralApproach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender
Ofers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819, 868-75 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Gilson, A StructuralApproach].
2. Bebchuk, The Case for FacilitatingCompeting Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1028
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Bebchuk, The CaseforFacilitatingCompeting Tender Offers]. Bebchuk
expands his position in this exchange. Bebchuk, The CaseforFacilitatingCompeting Tender O rs:
A Rep.y and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REv. 23 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Bebchuk, A Repy and
Extension].
3. Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs]. They first stated
their position in Easterbrook & Fischel, The ProperRole ofa Target'sManagement in Respondingto
a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. R.v. 1161, 1175-80 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Easterbrook &
Fischel, The ProperRole of a Target5sManagement].
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agency costs would increase. 4
I responded by noting that a first bidder could hedge its risk of
lost information costs by buying a block of the target's stock that
could be sold at a profit to a subsequent higher bidder.5 I also argued that any loss from a reduction in monitoring would be offset by
the increased efficiency that would result from allocating "target assets to their most efficient user." 6 Professors Easterbrook and Fischel
now concede the existence of a hedge, but argue that the hedge is
imperfect. In their view, even if first bidders both recover their sunk
costs and earn a return on the investment, the increase in takeover
prices associated with competitive bidding will nonetheless reduce
the return on investment in information below what would have
been earned in the absence of competitive bidding, with the same
undesirable results: a reduction in monitoring and an increase in
agency costs. In part I of this article, I argue that competitive bidding may increase rather than decrease the return on investment in
information. If this is correct, then the choice between the two rules
turns on their efficiency at resource allocation and on their susceptibility to abuse, points which I consider in parts II and III
respectively.
Before turning to a more detailed examination of the matters on
which Professors Easterbrook and Fischel and I disagree, it is important to emphasize the far more important area of agreement. Taken
together, our respective articles demonstrate that there is no coherent
justification for allowing target management to engage in defensive
tactics that may deprive shareholders of the opportunity to tender
their shares. Corporate managers must face up to the fact that such
conduct benefits only themselves. State courts must recognize that
the legal rules that facilitate this conduct, under the guise of deference to business judgment, do no more than sanction corporate
treason.
I.

SUNK COSTS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS

As Professors Easterbrook and Fischel now put the matter, auctions are undesirable if they result in "any reduction in the return
4. For a discussion of the monitoring function of tender offers, see Gilson, A Structural
Approah, sufra note 1, at 841-45; Easterbrook & Fischel, The ProperRole of a Target's Management, supra note 3, at 1168-74.

5. Gilson, A StructuralApproach, supa note 1, at 871.
6. Id. at 872.
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from search." 7 The reduced return leads to reduced investment in
search: This reduces the number of tender offers and, ultimately,
reduces the beneficial impact on agency costs which we all ascribe to
tender offers. Later in this article, I will argue that any reduction in
these benefits may be offset by the increased allocational efficiency
resulting from competitive bidding. But for now, I want to focus on
a broader claim that I suggested, but did not emphasize, in my earlier article:8 Not only can a first bidder recoup sunk costs if he loses
an auction, but it may well be that, for certain kinds of information
producers, auctions actually increase the return on investment in
search. If this is correct, the argument against competitive bidding
becomes substantially more difficult.
To understand the potential that competitive bidding has for increasing the return on investment in search, it is necessary to decompose a first bidder's investment in a takeover and examine the return
associated with each portion of that investment. One portion of a
bidder's investment is search costs, incurred to identify a target
whose value can be increased by displacing inefficient management
or through some form of synergy. The second portion is the amount
paid to secure control and implement the strategy necessary to take
advantage of the identified opportunity.
For purposes of illustration, assume that a potential bidder has
invested $2.5 million searching for a profitable acquisition and has
discovered a target with one million shares outstanding whose stock
is trading at $50 per share but would be worth $120 per share if new
management could be installed, corporate policies modified, and
some synergistic benefits gained. The potential bidder believes that,
in the absence of competitive bidding, a successful tender offer could
be made for $100 a share.
Consider two strategies to exploit the investment in information.
In the first, the traditional approach, the same entity that invests in
information also invests in implementation: The acquiring company
purchases 10% of the target's stock at $50 per share prior to the need
to make public disclosure and then follows with a successful tender
offer at the assumed price. Its total investment in information and
implementation is $97.5 million ($2.5 million for information costs,
$5 million for the pre-disclosure acquisition, and $90 million for the
90% of the target's stock which is acquired in the tender offer).9 Its
7. Easterbrook & Fischel, Aut ionsandSunk Costs,supra note 3, at 4 (emphasis in original).
8. See Gilson, A SniduralApproach, supra note 1, at 871-72 & nn.186-87.
9. I intend the amount representing investment in information to reflect all information
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return on the entire investment is $120 million-the target's presumed post-acquisition value-for a capital gain of $22.5 million or a
return of approximately 23%.
The second strategy seeks to capitalize only on the value of the
information and leaves the implementation to others. In a first variant of this approach, the information producer also takes a 10% stock
position but then, instead of making the tender offer itself, passes the
information along to another company who successfully completes
the offer at $100 a share. In this variant, the information producer
makes a total investment of $7.5 million ($2.5 million for information
and $5 million on its recently acquired stock), receives a total return
of $10 million for a capital gain of $2.5 million or a return of 331/3%,
some 10% higher than if it had also undertaken implementation. In
a second variant, instead of simply passing the information along to a
favored bidder, the information producer makes it public, presumably causing competitive bidding. As the auction drives up the premium, both the return on the information producer's stock position
and, thus, the return on the investment in information increases: As
the price approaches $120 per share, the return approaches 60%. The
effect is to further increase the disparity between the return from information production and the return garnered from both producing
and implementing the information.
This analysis suggests that a successful acquisition requires two
different sets of attributes: one involving information production
skills and not very much capital, the other involving the operating
skills required for implementing the takeover and substantially more
capital. I see no reason to expect that both sets will always be present
in a single entity. And if, as this analysis suggests, specialization does
occur, information producers would prefer a rule allowing target
management to facilitate competitive bidding, since competitive bidding would increase the return on their investment in information.
costs, including management time involved in the search. The figure representing investment
in implementation, however, reflects only the cost of purchasing the remaining shares. It does
not include transaction costs associated with the tender offer, nor the cost of implementing
the strategy designed to increase the target's value after the successful offer, an amount the
management literature considers substantial. Implementation costs include capital investment in the target, see, e.g., M. SALTER & W. WEINHOLD, DIVERSIFICATION THROUGH AcQUISITION:

STRATEGIES FOR CREATING

ECONOMIC VALUE 208-13

(1979)

(analyzing

Rockwell International's purchase of Admiral Corporation), as well as management time
needed to integrate the new business into the acquiring corporation, see id at 193. To the
extent that these costs are significant, the example in the text overstates the percentage return
on implementation. Thus, the example understates the amount by which the return on investment in information exceeds the return on implementation.
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Implementers, on the other hand, would prefer a rule of pure passivity since that rule, by making competitive bidding less likely, would
reduce takeover prices and enable implementers to secure higher returns by capturing some of the value associated with information
production.'0 In short, implementers, not information producers, are
10. As Easterbrook and Fischel suggest, as between one who produces only information
and one who implements as well, the comparative advantage in return and, correspondingly,
the incentive to invest in search depends on the price at which the acquisition can be completed. Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs, supra note 3, at 18-19. The higher the
price paid, the greater the advantage to the pure information producer because the higher
price raises the return on the information producer's 10% investment in the target's stock. A
higher price also increases the price that the integrated acquirer would have to pay to acquire
the remaining 90% of the target stock, thereby reducing its return more than proportionately.
Thus, if in my example the buyer could acquire the remaining 90%of the target's stock at an
average price of less than $73 a share, the return to an integrated acquirer would exceed that
to a pure information producer. If an integrated acquirer could systematically make acquisitions below this figure, designing a system to promote the interests of integrated acquirers
would result in greater aggregate expenditures on search.
But three considerations suggest that it is doubtful that the integrated acquirer would be
able to purchase the remaining stock at a sufficiently low price for it to have greater incentives to invest in search than would the pure information producer. First, the potential advantage to the integrated acquirer depends on the extent to which the very act of making the
offer results in an increase in the price of the target stock. It is true that a specific security
represents only a right to a future income stream with a particular risk-return relationship, for
which there are many substitutes, and this means that increased demand for the security
should not by itself result in a price increase. But the offer itself may convey sufficient new
information concerning the target that the price will rise to reflect this new information
rather than because of supply and demand characteristics. See Scholes, The Marketfor Securities: Substitution versus Price P essure and the Eficts of Information on Share Pnces, 45 J. Bus. 179
(1972). That there is substantial information value associated with a bid is suggested by the
fact that even unruccessfid tender offers result in substantial abnormal returns to target shareholders, in some cases exceeding the returns they would have earned had the offer been successful. See Bradley, Interfam Tender Offers and the Marketfor Corporate Control, 53 J. Bus. 345
(1980); Dodd & Ruback, Tender Offers and Stockholder Returns: An empirical analsis, 5 J. FIN.
ECON. 351 (1977). To the extent that pre-bid leaks of information are unavoidable, see note
13 in/fa, the price of the stock will rise to reflect this information value, reducing the return to
the integrated acquirer regardless of the likelihood of an auction.
Second, because implementation involves risk, it would not be surprising if integrated
acquirers earned a higher return (unadjusted for risk) than pure information producers. Although the return to an independent information producer depends only on the accuracy of
the information, the return to an integrated acquirer depends both on the quality of the
information produced and on the acquirer's ability to implement the post-offer strategy necessary to achieve the envisioned gains. Because of the additional risk associated with implementation, integrated acquirers may well require a higher return (unadjusted for risk) per unit of
search than specialized information producers.
Finally, and most importantly, the numerical example in the text does not, as Easterbrook and Fischel point out, include gains from specialization. See Easterbrook & Fischel,
Auctions and Sunk Costs, supra note 3, at 20. Adding these to the analysis, however, increases
the information producer's advantage over the integrated acquirer. Suppose that the principal advantage to specialization in information producing is that the specialist can produce
more accurate information, rather than that the information will be less costly. Although cost
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made worse off by competitive bidding. But that should not result in
less than the appropriate number of takeovers, since the implementers will always capture the entire value of their investment in
implementation. 1
Easterbrook and Fischel take issue with my argument at this
point by correctly pointing out that another alternative is available
to the specialized information producer: Rather than initiating an
auction by giving the information away, the producer could, if no
competitive bidding were allowed, sell the information to an implementer for a price reflecting some part of the $20 million gain that
would otherwise have been available to the implementer upon completing the takeover for the $100 million no-auction price.' 2 Applying their point to my example, so long as the payment for the
information exceeds $2 million, the information producer's gain from
selling it without an auction exceeds the increased value that an auc13
tion would give the information producer's target shares.
savings from specialization are also plausible, the more important point is that the information has a higher probability of being correct. Cf. C. HOLLOWAY, DECISION MAKING UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: MODELS AND CHOICES 348-50 (1979) (discussing value of increased certainty
and use of experts to obtain it). In the context of the example, the information producer can
more accurately predict whether there is an opportunity for increasing the target's value by
takeover.
Now suppose that the integrated acquirer assigns a 50/50 likelihood that its information
concerning the acquisition opportunity is correct. In that situation, the opportunity has a
negative expected value of $12.5 million to the integrated acquirer: a 50% likelihood of a
profit of $22.5 million if the information proves correct, and a 50% likelihood of a $47.5
million loss (cost of $97.5 million, post-acquisition value of $50 million) if the information
proves incorrect and the target is in fact worth no more than its pre-offer value. Further
suppose that the pure information producer can identify the existence of the acquisition opportunity with certainty. In that situation, given the uncertainty associated with its information, the price at which an integrated acquirer could purchase the remaining 90% of the
target would have to drop to approximately $60 per share before the acquisition would even
be a break-even proposition. But even at a price of $120 per share, it would have a positive
expected value for an acquirer with the benefit of the specialized producer's information.
The fact thaL specialized information producers can thus produce more valuable information
results in greater returns on their investment in search and, as a result, more search.
11. This example is intended to be illustrative rather than conclusive, though I believe
that the numbers are reasonable. It is important to note, however, that the comparison in the
text is between rates of return rather than absolute returns. In order for the comparison to be
fair, the assumption must be true that capital not invested in the takeover, when only the
investment in information is pursued, can be invested in the search for other targets with an
expected return that is also higher than the return on implementation. Otherwise, an average
return incorporating the available alternative investments would be a more accurate comparison. Put differently, it assumes that the competitive return from investment in information is
higher than from investment in implementation.
12. Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs, supra note 3, at 19.
13. In the example, the information producer holds 100,000 shares of the target stock.
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Evaluation of the sale alternative puts the issue in a somewhat
different context. Assuming that a specialized information producer
earns a higher return on its investment in information than an integrated acquirer, the question becomes how the information producer
can best exploit its advantage-by selling the information to an implementer or by fomenting competitive bidding. In both alternatives
the problem confronting the information producer is verification;
whichever is pursued, in order for the information producer to secure
any return on its investment in search, it must convince potential
acquirers that its information is of a quality that warrants investment
of up to $120 million. An information producer's preference between
the two alternatives, then, turns on a transaction cost analysis of
available solutions to the verification problem.
Consider first the sale alternative. 4 Information producers can
Since the auction can only increase the acquisition price from $100 per share to $120 per
share, the maximum benefit from the auction is $20 x 100,000 or $2,000,000.
It should be stressed, however, that the problem of leakage, see note 10 supra, still remains. And just as leakage strengthens the position of the pure information producer as opposed to the integrated acquirer, it also reduces the ability of the purchaser of the information
to secure all of the benefits of its purchase, thus diminishing, to the pure information producer, the attractiveness of the sale alternative, compared to the competitive bidding alternative. That there is substantial leakage in tender offers is suggested by the results of studies
tracking abnormal returns to target companies in the period prior to public announcement of
the transaction. For example, Keown and Pinkerton, in MergerAmouncements andInsider Trading Aclivity: An EmpiricalInvestigation, 36 J. FIN. 855 (1981), reported positive abnormal returns to target companies beginning 25 trading days prior to public announcement,
representing approximately half the total abnormal returns resulting from the transaction.
Substantial increases in trading volume accompanied these abnormal returns:
It was found that 79, 60, and 64 percent of the acquired firms exhibited higher
volume one, two, and three weeks prior to the announcement date than they had
three months earlier with the weekly average volume over this three week period
247, 112, and 102 percent higher than it was three months earlier. Such a pattern of
volume is, of course, what one would expect to find prior to a public merger announcement if inside information had leaked out.
Id at 863 (emphasis in original). A professional in a major solicitation firm explains the
leakage phenomenon as follows:
You start with a handful of people, but when you get close to doing something
the circle expands pretty quickly .. .. You have to bring in directors, two or three
firms of lawyers, investment bankers, public relations people, and financial printers,
and everybody's got a secretary. If the deal is a big one, you might need a syndicate
of banks to finance it. Every time you let in another person, the chance of a leak
increases geometrically.
Klein, Merger Leaks Abound Causing Many Stocks To Rise Before the Fact, Wall St. J., July 12,
1978, at 1, col. 6.
14. For a discussion of the substantial transaction costs associated with sales of information, see Barzel, Some Fallaciesin the InterpretationofInformation Costs, 20 J.L. & ECON. 291, 304
(1977) and Hirshleifer, The frivate and Social Value of Information andthe Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. EcoN. REV. 561, 565, 572 (1971).
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respond to the verification problem by strategies-characterizable
either as bonding or signalling-designed to ensure the authenticity
of the information to the buyer. For example, one would expect information producers who hope to sell information to make substantial investments in reputation, thereby both signaling that their
product is of a quality to warrant repeat purchases and putting their
investment in reputation at risk should the information prove to be
inaccurate.1 5 One might also expect the information producer to allow payment for the information to be conditioned on the success of
the transaction and, in order to avoid creating a conflict of interest
that could dilute the signal sent by investment in reputation, to voluntarily limit speculation in the identified target. 16
The pattern described, of course, is that of the major investment
banking houses.' 7 Having already made the investment in reputa15. One commentator, in discussing market responses to authentication problems, gives
the example of the diamond trade. Since diamond buying takes place without inspection or
appraisal by buyers,
De Beers has had to establish such a reputation that prospective buyers can be confident that the ultimate value of the [diamonds] exceeds [their] price. . . . The incentive for De Beers to engage in this peculiar form of trade seems to be that buyers
are now in a position to spend on the actual purchase of diamonds the amount they
otherwise might have spent on collecting information.
Barzel, supra note 14, at 304; see also Hirshleifer & Riley, The Ana'ytics of Uncertainty andInfomialion-An ExpostoV Sutva,17 J. EOON. LIT. 1375, 1406 (1979). My analysis is consistent with
the more general observation that in markets where product quality is difficult to determine
ex ante but not ex post, repeat sales are anticipated, and consumers have easy access to ex
post information, competition takes the form of investments in firm specific capital, like
brand names and advertising, that act as barriers to entry. Klein & Leffler, The Role ofMarket
Forces in Assuring ContractualPerformane, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 626-33 (1981); see also Barzel,
Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets, 25 J.L. & EOON. 27 (1982).
16. Easterbrook and Fischel point out that problems of information verification also can
be solved by vertical integration. Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs, supra note 3,
at 19. See generally 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 82-105 (1975). They suggest that combining the information and implementation functions avoids any problems specialization might create. The viability of
vertical integration, however, involves more than economizing on transaction costs. It is also
critical that the firm have an internal or external market for the function to be integrated that
is sufficient to exhaust scale economies. See M. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 300-28
(1980). Indeed, Williamson begins his discussion of vertical integration by assuming that
each stage of production "exhausts scale economies." 0. WILLIAMSON, supra, at 82. While I
am not aware of any study of efficient scale in the merger and acquisition business, the success
of the investment banking community in this area suggests that it is too large for vertical
integration to be a readily available option for most acquiring companies.
- 17. This analysis also explains the seemingly very high fees charged by the
merger and
acquisition departments of investment banking firms. While the fees might seem high in
relation to the actual hours expended in the implementation stage-actually formulating the
terms of the offer and accomplishing the transaction--they may not seem so high when considered as payment for information of assured quality.
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tion, the transaction costs associated with selling their information
are comparatively small. Further, their expectation of a continuing
relationship with the information buyer through provision of fungible investment banking services following the acquisition serves to
make a portion of the banker's total fee for the information contingent not only on the successful acquisition of the target, but also on
the ultimate accuracy of the information concerning the opportunity:
If the information proves inaccurate, the buyer will terminate the
continuing services, and fees, of the investment banker.' 8 It is thus
hardly surprising that investment bankers follow a sale alternative.' 9
But the sale alternative is not the only strategy open to information producers. Indeed, for producers without either a preexisting
investment in reputation or the capital and time to adopt the verification techniques used by investment bankers, this strategy may not
even be available. For them, disclosure of their information in order
to promote competitive bidding may be the only verification mechanism available and, therefore, the only way to appropriate the return
on their investment in information. First, the bidding process itself
acts as a verification technique.2 0 Second, it can also be used to cause
the producer's information to be verified by the best possible source:
the target. An information producer might adopt the strategy of announcing, together with its information and its stock position, that it
intended to cause the target to be acquired by someone. This would
18. In contrast to the bonding and signaling strategies, which are essentially screening
techniques, this is closer to a hostage strategy, whereby one party to an exchange reduces its
incentives to behave opportunistically-in our case by misrepresenting the accuracy of information-by putting the other party in a position to respond if opportunism turns out to have
occurred. See 0. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange
(draft, Sept. 1982). It is important to note that this is a very expensive verification technique
because it is available only to a diversified information producer who, like an investment
bank, can offer post-acquisition services to the buyer.
19. As such, it is also not surprising that investment bankers are generally credited with
devising the lock-up (for example, granting the first bidder an option to purchase the target's
most attractive asset) and split-price (paying a higher price for shares tendered during the
pro-ration period) strategies used in the recent U.S. Steel/Marathon and Marshall Field/
Batus transactions. Both of these devices are designed to reduce the likelihood of competitive
bidding. As sellers of information, investment bankers do not gain from auctions.
That investment bankers actually view themselves as information sellers is suggested by a
recent Wall SlretlJoumal advertisement placed by a major banker-Blyth Eastman Paine
Webber. The advertisement stressed that in many instances Blyth "not only negotiated the
acquisition, but initiated it as well-that is, we established the company's value, developed
the strategy, and suggested the eventual buyer or seller. In fact, we initiated more mergers
and acquisitions last year than any other investment banker, and are initiating and completing such transactions at an even higher rate this year." Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 1982, at 49.
20. See text accompanying note 23 infia.
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create an incentive for target management to select the ultimate acquirer-to seek a white knight. In this case, verification of the producer's information is provided by the target through its attempts to
prove to those potential acquirers that it approaches the existence of
the very opportunity the information producer has disclosed.
Institutional arrangements reflect this pattern as well. For example, Carl Icahn does not sell his information; he profits by reselling
target stock to implementers. And his position on the benefits of auctions is also clear. When Marshall Field gave Batus lock-up options
intended to prevent competitive bidding, Icahn attempted to invalidate them.2 '
In short, the impact of auctions on incentives to produce information is at the very least mixed. Some producers will benefit from
auctions, others will not, and the balance will depend on transaction
costs and other factors associated with actual practices-about which
we know far too little. But it is clear that theory alone, unadorned by
evaluation of transaction costs, does not preordain either the direc22
tion or the magnitude of the impact.
Another consideration also suggests that competitive bidding has
a more complicated impact on incentives for search and takeover
than East.erbrook and Fischel acknowledge. An initial bid does signal some of the first bidder's information; but competing bids also
disclose information. Frequently a white knight overbids because the
target has given it information, not available to the first bidder, that
demonstrates that the target is worth more than the initial bid. Now
consider the strategy that a potential first bidder should adopt when
21. See Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, No. 82 Civ. 0755 (PNL), slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
26, 1982).
22. Specialization in information production-both as between implementers and information producers and as between different types of producers--should also have a beneficial
impact on the amount of search, wholly apart from either the comparative returns on search
and implementation or the comparative returns on the sale and competitive bidding alternatives. If a return on search can be earned only by those with the capital to implement, or with
the capital also to invest in reputation and other verification techniques necesssary to sell the
information produced, substantial entry barriers to the search industry are created. Specialization and the allowance of competitive bidding remove these barriers and will lead to increased investment in search so long as the return on search that is obtainable by taking a
speculative position is attractive in comparison to the return available on other available
investments. This would be true even if the return on search is less than the return to implementers, or than the return to information producers with the capital investment necessary
for sale. Thus, competitive bidding may increase the overall investment in search because the
resulting increase in return to the potentially more numerous specialized information producers draws new entrants into the search industry. This influx will outweigh the reduction in
search by non-specialized producers or investment bankers that is caused by decreases in their
total return.
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it discovers information which discloses, subject to some uncertainty,
that a target is worth twice its market price. If the information is
correct, the first bidder would be willing to pay a significant premium; but the initial bid will not fully reflect this premium. If the
information is incorrect, the target is worth no more than the present
market value, and this uncertainty will be reflected in the initial bid.
In this setting the white knight's bid reduces the first bidder's uncertainty and, hence, should cause the first bidder to be willing to pay
more for the target than it would have in the absence of a second bid.
Thus, while a second bid increases the takeover price and therefore
reduces the first bidder's absolute return, it may not reduce its r'kadusted return. One could well imagine a strategy of bidding well
under the expected value of the target with the intention not of seeking a bargain, but rather of withdrawing the offer in the absence of a
second bid. 3
If either or both of these points are correct, Easterbrook and Fischel's argument that competitive bidding necessarily reduces the return on investment in information becomes much more difficult. 4
Even if competitive bidding reduces the return in some cases, it may
increase it in others, leaving the overall effect indeterminate. And
23. This phenomenon simply reflects an integrated acquirer using a market response,
the competitive bidding process, to solve the problem of verifying information, here by recourse to the cheapest verifier--target management itself. A rule of pure passivity bars access
to this source of risk reduction by preventing target management from seeking competitive
bids.
24. To the extent that Bebchuk favors auctions as a means of diminishing the incentives
to search for takeovers that result in no social gains, he may prefer Easterbrook and Fischel's
position on this point. See Bebchuk, The Casefor FacilitatingCompeting Tender O49rs, snpra note
2, at 1032-33; Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs, supra note 3, at 3-7. As is clear
from my initial article, Gilson, A StrcturalApproach, supra note 1, and subsequent writing,
Gilson, The Case Against Shark RepellantAmendments: StructuralLimitationson the Enabling Concepit,
34 STAN. L. REv. 775 (1982), I agree with Easterbrook and Fischel that, overall, tender offers
result in real gains.
I am skeptical, however, of the conclusion that data provides "compelling evidence that
there are real gains involved in almost all offers." Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk
Costs, supra note 3, at 11. The data referred to does not distinguish between types of acquisitions and it is clear that pure diversification acquisitions cannot result in real gains. See, e.g.,
R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 657-66 (1981). To be sure,
the current divestiture movement, see Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions andSunk Costs, supra note
3, at 14 n.30; note 31 infra, is evidence that the market eventually catches up, but the delay,
perhaps due to the absence of hostile takeovers during most of the period covered by the
studies, allows more room for transactions which principally benefit management. See note
30 infra. The data is thus consistent with the presence of some transactions which do not
reflect real gains but which are outweighed by those that do. The issue then becomes the
overall efficiency of the market for corporate control, a point which looms larger with respect
to the allocational issue. See text accompanying notes 26-31 infra.
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even if there were a net reduction in the return on investment in
search, it would be considerably smaller than Easterbrook and
Fischel expect. Thus, the issue of which rule-competitive bidding
or pure passivity-leads to greater allocational efficiency becomes
more important. Indeed, if competitive bidding does result in a net
increase in the total investment in search by all types of information
producers, those favoring a rule of pure passivity would have to show
that a series of sales would be a more efficient allocational mechanism
than an auction, a position Easterbrook and Fischel seem prepared to
advance.2 5
II.

ALLOCATIONAL EFFICIENCY

There is agreement that tender offers serve an allocational role,
and that competitive pricing generally facilitates the shifting of assets
to their most productive users. What separates Easterbrook and
Fischel's position from mine is their claim that a series of independent sales can cause assets to be shifted to their most productive users
as efficiently as competitive bidding in connection with a single
sale. 26 I disagree. While resolution of this issue turns on a comparative analysis of transaction costs, which would require a good deal
more effort than has been undertaken by either Easterbrook and Fischel or myself, it is critical to note that a rule allowing target management to solicit competitive bids cannot be less efficient than a rule
requiring managerial passivity. If would-be second bidders have a
choice between entering a competitive bid or acquiring the target
later from the first bidder, they will presumably choose the cheaper
method. Therefore, the fact that many competing bids are made is
27
powerful empirical evidence that a rule of passivity is inefficient.
Indeed, unless we are certain that a series of sales is cheaper in ev" ,
transaction, choice is preferable. My rule gives acquirers that choice.
Some considered speculation may suggest why competitive bidding is likely to be more efficient than a series of sales. Let me start
with two important elements of transaction costs in the acquisition
setting: information costs necessary to identify the opportunity; and
mechanical costs-for example, lawyers', accountants', and invest25. Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs, supra note 3, at 15 ("The allocational
benefits of auctions thus seem to be small if not negative.").
26. Id at 14.
27. Notice, also, that both the relative disincentive to implement the acquisition and the
efficiency gain from competitive bidding increase with the number of competitive bids. Thus,
the greater the increase in agency costs caused by numerous bidders, the greater the offsetting
increase in allocational efficiency.
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ment bankers' fees-necessary to effect the transaction and cope with
regulatory or other barriers (including defensive tactics by the target). I suspect that information costs are greater in a series of sales,
simply because the wheel must be reinvented each time. In fact, the
cost of reinvention may actually rise: While public information
about the business is readily available from regulatory filings and
shareholder reports at the time of the initial transfer, by the time of a
succeeding transfer this information may be buried in a mass of less
useful data covering the combined company.
With respect to mechanical costs, I see no reason to think that
they will be materially higher in an auction setting; indeed, there are
economies of scale in getting it all over at once. The clearest example
is the saving in management time. After each sale in a series of sales
substantial investments of management time would be needed to integrate the acquired business, a task which the management litera28
ture takes quite seriously.
Finally, let me consider a third category of transaction costsagency costs. Easterbrook and Fischel, arguing that a series of sales
would result in allocational efficiency, state that "[t]here is. . . little
evidence to support the belief that managers systematically reject the
opportunity to profit by selling plants and divisions," any more than
managers systematically reject the opportunity to profit by selling
new products.2 9 While there may be no hard evidence, there is good
theory, recited in both their initial article and in my own, suggesting
that managers may overinvest in both new products and new divisions. Managers, when given the opportunity, will maximize their
own welfare at the expense of shareholders. If managers personally
gain from maximizing the size of their enterprise, they may well
choose to forgo the opportunity to sell a division even at a price reflecting capitalization of a higher income than the division yields
under their direction.30
28. Ste note 9supra. Easterbrook and Fischel, inAuction andSunk Costs, supra note 3, at 6,
recognize the value of management time, and counsel against overlooking it in computing
sunk information costs, but ignore it as a cost in this context.
29. Easterbrook & Fischel, Auelion and Sunk Costs, supra note 3, at 14-15.

30. There is some evidence of this phenomenon. Reduction of risk by diversification at
the company level does not increase the value of the company because shareholders can diversify their own portfolios more cheaply. Diversification at the company level, however, is of
substantial value to managers; because of their human capital investment and the impact-of
incentive compensation plans, they would find it difficult to adequately diversify at the individual level. Because managers are affected differently than shareholders by different kinds of
acquisitions, the more control managers have, the more frequent will be those transactions
which favor them. The available data, while sketchy, is consistent with this prediction, sug-
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If allocational efficiency is to be achievable through a series of
sales, this behavior must be constrained; agency theory demonstrates
that to reject managerialism requires imposing limits on managers
rather than relying on managerial altruism. If managers selfishly
choose to forgo the profitable sale of a division, then resort to a
tender offer-which we all acknowledge plays a central role in constraining management-is necessary. But the problem with achieving allocational efficiency by a series of sales is that tender offers face
greater barriers when what is sought is a division, rather than an
independent company of equivalent size. If management actively or
passively resists the second sale in the series, the offer will not only be
a hostile one, it will be a larger transaction than the original because
the second round covers the combined corporation. This reduces the
number of potential bidders, and hence reduces the likelihood that
the assets will end up being used as efficiently as they would have
been had they been initially acquired in an auction. While the problem may be ameliorated by the ability to resell unwanted assets after
the transaction, a post-transaction sell-off would necessarily
involve
31
increased uncertainty, causing the problem to remain.
Moreover, if any defensive tactics are pursued, moving assets to
their most efficient users becomes far more expensive if done through
a series of sales; costs that are incurred only once in the auction
model must be repeatedly incurred in the series of transactions
model. Because no prohibition is perfect, even if defensive tactics are
prohibited, as Easterbrook, Fischel, and I all advise, they will nonetheless still exist to some extent.
III.

RULE EFFICIENCY

Easterbrook and Fischel finally argue that the rule I recommend-prohibiting defensive tactics but permitting management to
solicit competitive bids-will allow defensive tactics to be undertaken under a guise of neutrality and, to that extent, will result in a
gesting that management-controlled firms, far more frequently than shareholder-controlled

firms, make conglomerate, as opposed to horizontal or vertical, acquisitions. Amihud & Lev,
Risk Reduction as a ManagerialMotivefor Conglomerate Mergers, 12 BELL J. EcON. 605 (1981).
31. That is not to say that sell-offs of divisions will not occur. Indeed, approximately
half the acquisitions in recent years were not of previously independent companies, but of
businesses being divested by someone else. See M. SALTER & W. WEINHOLD, supra note 9, at
17. Rather, there will be a reduction in allocative efficiency at the margin, a problem which
Easterbrook and Fischel recognize in the sunk cost contekt. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions
and Sunk Costs, supra note 3, at 7.
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loss not incurred under a pure passivity rule.3 2 I expect that such a
loss, if it occurred at all, would be small. 33 Moreover, the potential
for loss must be compared to the similar problems that would arise
under a pure passivity rule.
As I pointed out in my original article, the tender offer process
often opens with a bear-hug letter suggesting a friendly acquisition
but implicitly threatening that if negotiations are refused a hostile
tender offer will follow. 34 Easterbrook and Fischel leave unclear
whether a pure passivity rule would allow target management to seek
competitive offers after receipt of such a letter, or whether they could
only seek offers where they initiate the first contact. Consider a continuum running from tentative discussions at one extreme to a hostile
tender offer at the other. If the point beyond which a passivity rule
prohibits target management from seeking alternatives is drawn
early, then the advantages of a truly negotiated merger or sale of
assets are lost; 35 target management must pursue other offers at once
or lose that option for good. Alternatively, if the point is set late, then
an acquirer has an incentive to move there immediately in order to
prevent a competing bid, perhaps at the cost of giving up information that negotiations would have provided. Either way, the forced
takeover displaces the activity-negotiated takeovers-that it was
supposed to monitor.
In any event, under a pure passivity rule, one must draw some line
specifying when an offer has gone "too" far to allow the solicitation
of competitive bids. This exercise, however, has the same potential
32. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs, sutira note 3, at 15.
33. It is hard to say whether the potential difficulty of distinguishing solicitation of competitive bids from prohibited defensive tactics actually would lead managers to try to disguise
defensive tactics as neutral solicitation of competitive bids. Such a determination would require a more detailed analysis of the relation between the manner in which a rule is formulated and the amount of conduct the rule deters than is possible here. See Gilson, A Structural
Approach, supra note 1, at 881-87. For present purposes it is enough to note that at least
independent directors would have little incentive to engage in such subterfuge since the gain
from the effort would go largely to management, while the risk, made more real by the clear
prohibition of defensive tactics, would be shared by the independent directors. Id. at 884-85.
This point aside, however, the Brunswick/Whittaker/American Home Products situation referred to in Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs, supra note 3, at 15 n.33, is an
unlikely candidate for such a masquerade. Both my rule and one of pure passivity would bar
selling a substantial portion of the business as a defensive tactic designed to make the target
less attractive to the hostile bidder. See Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill.
1982).
34. See Gilson, A Structural Approach, supra note 1, at 874-75.
35. See id at 846-47, 868.
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for creating uncertainty and unintended costs as Easterbrook and
Fischel claim would be created by my more limited prohibition.
IV.

CONCLUSION

I have argued that, on balance, allowing target management to
solicit competing bids may increase rather than decrease return on
investment in search, and that such a rule will increase allocative
efficiency. But I have not proved that this rule is preferable, and
Professors Easterbrook and Fischel acknowledge that they have not
proved the superiority of a pure passivity rule. We are, rather, in the
world of policymaking, where choices are characterized by uncertainty, and where we are comforted by such empirical evidence as is
available and are aided by such theory as we can manage. The major benefit of this exchange has been to clarify the basis for our difference so that those who really are charged with policymaking can do
so with a better sense of the competing considerations and the assumptions on which those considerations are based. Indeed, if the
exchange has accomplished nothing else, it has identified the character of the research needed to resolve this difference. The research
must focus on as yet unanswered empirical questions concerning
transactional patterns and costs, questions which become critical
when theory is superimposed on reality. At the same time, however,
I think it is critical to reiterate again what we have proved: Defensive
tactics are unjustifiable. The differences pursued in this exchange should
36
not be allowed to obscure that central and far more important fact.
36. Bebchuk stresses that his disagreement with Easterbrook and Fischel over the issue
of a required waiting period is more significant than one might assume from my emphasis on
our consensus concerning prohibiting defensive tactics. See Bebchuk, A Repy and Extension,
supra note 2, at 24-25 & n.8. Perhaps I pay too little heed to this problem, but I think not. I
base my reduced concern in part on pragmatic grounds: The present Williams Act effectively
provides a significant waiting period, 15 U.S.C. § 78/(k) (1976), and, whatever the terms of
our debate, repeal of that legislation seems unlikely. In part, however, I also base it on the
more substantive belief that the prohibition of defensive tactics by target management really
does reduce the importance of the waiting period.
A central theme of my writing in this area has been that evaluation of corporate regulation requires a structural approach: one that takes into account both the nonlegal constraints
operating on the corporation and its constituents and the fact that a change in one part of the
structure evokes a response from other parts that must be considered in evaluating the original change. See Gilson, A StruturalApproach, supra note 1, at 831-51; Gilson, supra note 24, at
831-34. Thus, the importance of the waiting period issue has to be considered in the context
of a setting in which defensive tactics are prohibited.
But what happens to management's incentives when defensive tactics are prohibited?
The prohibition should convince the managers of a potential target that the company cannot
remain independent if an offer is made at more than the market price, and this will affect how
they will behave in the preoffer period when they perceive their company a likely target. If
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they cannot prevent a tender offer, then their incentives more closely parallel those of the
shareholders: Get the best price (including management perquisites) possible. Thus, when
managers believe that the company is worth more than market value, they have a substantial
incentive, now undiluted by the option of continued independence, to sell the company in a
fashion that allows them to share in the gain. This is not to say that management would not
prefer to remain independent, but only that, when remaining independent has been made
more difficult, if not impossible, by the prohibition of defensive tactics, management's second
best solution may be to actively promote the sale of the company. Thus, active solicitation of
a buyer before an offer is made would likely preempt a hostile tender offer, making negotiated
transactions the principal means of acquisition. This is precisely the outcome I have argued is
most desirable-making tender offers operate as monitoring mechanisms rather than as the
primary activity. See Gilson,A StrtcluralApproach,supranote 1, at 848-52; text accompanying
note 35 sufpra. In this regard it is critical to recall that if agents were costlessly loyal there
would be no need for tender offers; if we reduce the divergence in interests that necessitates
monitoring in the first place, issues concerning the terms of the monitoring technique recede
in importance.
This is the context in which the issue of a waiting period must be evaluated. To be sure,
the rules that apply when a tender offer comes first-permitting target management to solicit
competitive bids and assuring them enough time to do it-remain important; but, I think, less
so than when the prohibition of defensive tactics has not tempered the conflict between the
incentives of managers and shareholders. Put simply, if offered the choice of two boons by the
regulatory genie-either prohibit defensive tactics or impose a waiting period-prohibition
seems to me by far the better choice.

